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RATIONAL  COOPERATION  IN  THE  FINITELY 
REPEATED  PRISONER'S  DILEMMA: 
EXPERIMENTAL  EVIDENCE* 
James  Andreoni  and  John H. Miller 
In the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, it is well known that defection in 
every game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows 
from the familiar backward-induction  arguments. Kreps et al. (i 982),  however, 
show that if there is incomplete information about the types of players then 
cooperation early in  the game can  be consistent with  rational behaviour.1 
Suppose, that  both  players believe that  there is a small chance that  their 
opponent may be altruistic. For instance, the opponent may get extra pleasure 
from mutual cooperation or may even adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. Then  it 
could be in each player's best interest to pretend, at least for some time,-  to be 
an altruistic player in order to build a reputation for cooperation, until the 
game eventually unravels to mutual defection. 
The sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis has become influential in 
many literatures. It has become important to know whether this hypothesis has 
good  predictive  power,  and  whether  individuals  will  rationally  build 
reputations.  It  is  also  of  interest  to  know  whether  some  fraction of  the 
population actually have altruistic motives. In literatures on social dilemmas 
there has been extensive discussion about whether altruistic concerns, like 
gaining  extra  pleasure  from  mutual  cooperation,  are  necessary for  the 
characterisation of preferences.2 
There is some evidence from experiments on both reputation building and 
altruism. Camerer and Weigelt (I988)  consider an eight-period game of loan 
contracts, and find that the behaviour of subjects largely meets the sequential 
equilibrium prediction, although lenders are slightly more optimistic about the 
probability of repayment than the experimental controls merit. Camerer and 
Weigelt refer to this optimism as 'homemade priors' that subjects bring to the 
experiment from outside and use to supplement the priors controlled for by the 
experimenter. Adjusting for these homemade priors, Camerer and Weigelt find 
a close match with the theory.3 Selten and Stoecker (1  986) also find that, with 
sufficient experience, subjects appear  to  learn  the  sequential  equilibrium, 
*  We are grateful to Robyn Dawes, Paul Milgrom, John Carter, and two anonymous referees  for helpful 
comments, and to Dan Schneidewend and Soren Hauge for expert programming and research assistance. 
Andreoni also thanks the National Science Foundation, grant SES 882  I 204, for financial support. Errors  are 
the responsibility of the authors. 
1  See also Kreps and Wilson (I982),  and Milgrom and Roberts (I982). 
2  See, e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (i 988), Andreoni (i 989, I  990),  and Cooper et al. ( I990)  for a discussion 
of this. 
3  See Camerer and Weigelt (I988)  for a more complete discussion of other experiments that pertain to 
reputation building. 
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although  subjects are more cooperative  than predicted.  McKelvey  and Palfrey 
(I992)  find  significant  evidence  of  reputation  building  in  centipede-game 
experiments,  but  also find  important  effects  of altruism.  Further  evidence  on 
altruism  comes  from  the  literatures  on  prisoner's  dilemma  and  public  goods, 
where  experiments  indicate  that  subjects  may  have  their  own  altruistic 
preferences  that  interfere  with  the  incentives  of the  experiment.  Such  effects 
have  been  identified  by  Palfrey  and  Rosenthal  (I988),  among  others.4 
This paper examines  cooperation  in the finitely  repeated  prisoner's dilemma 
by directly  testing  the model  posed  by Kreps et al.  (1 982).  We consider  a series 
of finitely  repeated  prisoner's dilemma  games in which  we manipulate  subjects' 
beliefs about  their opponent's  type. By raising the probability  that a player will 
have  an altruistic  opponent,  we increase  the benefits to reputation  building.  Of 
course,  if  subjects  really  do  have  altruistic  preferences,  then  we  cannot 
completely  control  the  homemade  priors  that  subjects  may  bring  to  the 
experiment  from outside.  Therefore,  we also include  a control  group  that plays 
repeated  single-shots  of prisoner dilemma,  and thus has no opportunity  to build 
reputations.  By comparing  this group  to the others, we are able to measure  the 
effect  of  reputation  building  over  'homemade  altruism',  that  is,  people's 
natural  tendency  to cooperate. 
The  result is that  the sequential  equilibrium  reputation  model  appears  to be 
a  good  predictive  model  of  cooperative  behaviour  in  the  finitely  repeated 
prisoner's  dilemma.  Subjects  seem  to  undertake  significant  efforts  to  build 
reputations  for altruism.  However,  we also find that those reputations  are well- 
deserved.  In  the  group  that  cannot  build  reputations,  we  find  a  consistent 
pattern  of cooperation  that  does  not deteriorate,  even  after 200  single  shots of 
the prisoner's dilemma.  Hence,  there clearly appears to be a significant  number 
of 'altruistic  types'  in the population.  This  finding  is consistent  with  evidence 
from  other  social  sciences.  For  instance,  in  a  detailed  analysis  of  prisoner's 
dilemma  experiments,  psychologists  Kelley  and  Stahelski  (I970)  conclude, 
'There  are  two  stable  types  of  individuals  which  may  be  described 
approximately  as cooperative  and  competitive  personalities'  (p.  66).5  These 
cooperative  or  altruistic  players  appear  to  form  the  basis  for  reputation 
building.  While  in theory  all that is required for cooperation  is sufficient beliefs 
that  altruists exist,  in practice  such  beliefs appear  to be consistent  with  actual 
tastes  for cooperation. 
I.  THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
Fig.  I  shows  the  prisoner's  dilemma  payoff  matrix  used  in  the  experiments 
reported  here.  Kreps  et  al.  (I982)  describe  an  equilibrium  in  the  finitely 
'  See Roth and Murnigham (I978)  and Roth  (I988)  for reviews of prisoner's  dilemma experiments 
a historical review of prisoner's dilemma experiments in  psychology and  sociology, see Rapoport 
Chammah  (I965).  See Dawes and Thaler  (I988)  for a recent review and discussion of cooperatic 
providing public goods. 
5  For reviews and discussions of the psychology and sociology literatures on cooperation and altri 
behaviour, see Dawes  (I980)  and Piliavin and Charng (I990). 
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Cooperate  Defect 
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Player 1  4 
Defect 
12  4 
Fig.  i.  The prisoner's dilemma. 
repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  in which  two  rational  players  both  believe  that 
there  is  a  small  probability,  8,  that  the  other  is  'irrational'.  They  give  two 
examples  of  irrationality.  First,  the  opponent  may  be  playing  a  tit-for-tat 
strategy,  which  begins  by  cooperating,  and  then  plays  whatever  its opponent 
played  on the last round.  Second,  players  could  believe  the opponent  may  get 
extra  utility  from  mutual  cooperation,  such  that  cooperation  is  the  best 
response to cooperation.  In each case, a sufficiently  high  a  can lead each player 
to adopt  a strategy  of the sort 'cooperate  until  round  T, or until  my opponent 
defects,  and  defect  thereafter'.  Higher  values  of  8  will  tend  to  increase  the 
amount  of cooperation. 
A  strict  interpretation  of  the  Kreps  et al.  theory  is that  no  'irrational'  or 
'altruistic'  types need to exist, but only that there are sufficient beliefs that such 
types  exist.  This  has been  called  the rationality  hypothesis.  It has been  noted 
that  this strict interpretation  of the model  requires players'  beliefs about  types 
to differ  from  the  actual  distribution  of types  (Samuelson,  I987).  Hence,  the 
model  would  be  more  natural  if some  players  actually  were  altruistic.  This 
alternative  has become  known  as the altruism  or 'warm-glow'  hypothesis,  and 
has  been  suggested  by  many  researchers.6  All  of  the  alternative  models  of 
altruism can be viewed  as one of, or some combination  of, three similar models. 
Each  model  includes  a  single  altruism  parameter,  a,  but  makes  different 
assumptions  about  its use. The  three models  are:  (i) Pure Altruism. Let pi be the 
payoff  of person i. Then  under this model,  the utility  of player i is Ui = pi +  xp1, 
o < ax  i.  Hence,  these  players  care  directly  about  the  payoff  of  the  other 
player.  (ii) Duty. Utility  Ui = pi + a, where  a  )  o whenever  i cooperates  and is 
zero otherwise.  Here,  i feels an obligation  to cooperate.  (iii) Reciprocal  Altruism. 
Utility  Ui = pi+ a,  where  a  >, o whenever  both  i and  i's opponent  cooperate 
and  is zero  otherwise.  Here  there  is special  pleasure  in successful  cooperation. 
This  is the  model  suggested  by  Kreps  et al. (I982). 
In general,  (i) and  (ii) can support  three equilibrium  strategies  in the single 
shot game,  depending  on the payoff parameters  in the prisoner's dilemma.  The 
6  In  addition to Kreps et al.  (I982),  see Palfrey and Rosenthal  (I988),  Dawes  (I980),  Stark (I985), 
Camerer (I988),  and Cooper et al.  (I990),  among others. 
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first two  are dominant  strategies  for either  defection  (if a  is sufficiently  small) 
or cooperation  (if a  is sufficiently  large).  The  third  equilibrium  strategy  is a 
matching  strategy,  where  players  find  cooperation  a  best  response  to 
cooperation,  and defection  a best response  to defection.  Hence,  if the chance  is 
sufficiently  high  that  one's opponent  will  cooperate,  then  the optimal  strategy 
for  an  altruist  is  to  cooperate.  For  the  parameter  values  chosen  for  our 
experiment,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  only  the  first  two  strategies  are  possible 
equilibrium  strategies  in the one shot game.7 This  means  that if (i) or (ii) is the 
correct  model,  then  only  a dominant  strategy  of cooperation  or  a dominant 
strategy  of  defection  are  possible.  Model  (iii)  differs  from  these  in  that  the 
matching  can  be  an  equilibrium  strategy  if a  is greater  than  the  temptation 
payoff  (I 2  here)  minus  the  cooperative  payoff  (7 here).  If a  is less than  this 
amount,  then  there is a dominant  strategy  for defection.  Also,  there can  be no 
dominant  strategy  of cooperation  under reciprocal  altruism,  no matter how big 
a.  Other  theories of altruism can be generated  with  combinations  of the above, 
so  these  models  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive.  For  the  parameters  chosen, 
however,  it is clear  that  extra  utility  from  mutual  cooperation  is essential  for 
cooperation  to emerge.  For this reason, and to maintain  consistency  with Kreps 
et al.  (i  982),  we will  focus further discussion  on  the reciprocal  altruism  model 
of warm-glow  alone. 
If  people  are  altruistic,  then  one  implication  is  that  cooperation  can  be 
maintained  in  single-shot  plays  of  the  prisoner's  dilemma,  even  without  the 
possibility  of  reputation  building.  When  we  consider  the  finitely  repeated 
prisoner's  dilemma  with  altruism,  we  also  get  a  sequential  equilibrium 
prediction  that  repeated  play  should  increase  cooperation.  Unless  there  is 
common  knowledge  that  everyone  in the population  has an a  parameter  that 
supports  the  cooperative  equilibrium,  then  it may  pay  all subjects  to  build  a 
reputation  for being  altruistic,  but  to defect  late  in the game.  In  this way,  the 
sequential  equilibrium  predictions  are  the  same  for both  altruistic  and  non- 
altruistic  populations.  However,  we should  not expect  all patterns  of play  to be 
independent  of the degree  of altruism.  According  to the rationality  hypothesis 
as it becomes  increasingly  clear that the population  is all 'rational',  cooperation 
should  become  increasingly  difficult  to maintain.  Hence,  in a series of finitely 
repeated  games,  against  a variety  of opponents,  defection  should  tend  to occur 
earlier and earlier in each  repeated  game  (Selton  and  Stoecker,  I986).  On  the 
other  hand,  if  people  are  altruistic,  then  as  the  true  proportion  of  altruists 
becomes  known  one could  observe  cooperation  extending  until later and later, 
since  altruistic  subjects  will  become  more  confident  that  cooperation  will  be 
reciprocated. 
The  next  section  will  outline  the  design  of  the  experiment  used  to  discuss 
reputation  building,  and  will  specify  the  hypotheses  we  will  examine. 
7  Consider duty.  For cooperation to  be a  best response to  cooperation, it  must be  that  a >  5  (i.e. 
I 2 -7  =  5). For defection to be a best response  to defection, it must be that a <  4 (i.e. 4-  o). These conditions 
cannot be met simultaneously, eliminating the mixed strategy. Similar results hold for pure altruism. 
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II.  EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN 
This  experiment  was  run  with  four  conditions,  each  requiring  I4  subjects.8 
Subjects interacted  over a computer  network.  Each subject participated  in only 
one  session,  and  each  session ran only  one  condition.  Subjects  were  randomly 
assigned  to computer  terminals  at the start of the experiment.  They  were given 
written  instructions,  which  were  read  aloud  at  the  start  of the  session.  Each 
session lasted  less than  go minutes,  and  subjects  earned  an average  of $I  I.65. 
All subjects were paid privately,  in cash, at the end of the experiment.  Subjects 
were  recruited  from introductory  microeconomics  courses  at the University  of 
Wisconsin.  A copy of the subjects' instructions  is included  as an appendix  to this 
paper. 
The  four conditions  are the following: 
I.  Partners.  The  computer  randomly  paired  the  I4  subjects,  and each subject 
played  a I  o-period  repeated  prisoner's dilemma  with  their partner. All pairings 
were anonymous.  Subjects  then  received  a summary  of their earnings  from the 
ten-period  game.  They  were  then  randomly  rematched  with  another  partner 
for another  io-period  game.  This  was done  for a total  of 20  Io-period  games, 
that  is, for a total  of 200  rounds  of the  prisoner's  dilemma. 
In  the  partners  condition,  subjects  play  a series of finitely  repeated  games, 
each time with  a new partner.  In every ten-period  game,  therefore, subjects can 
gain from reputation  building.  However,  since there are only  I4  subjects, as the 
experiment  progresses subjects should  get greater and greater knowledge  about 
the  true  distribution  of types.  Under  a hypothesis  of no  altruism,  one  would 
predict  that  with  each  io-period  game  cooperation  should  become  harder  to 
sustain,  especially  near the end of the experiment  (Selten  and  Stoecker,  I986). 
However,  if there  really  are altruistic  types,  then  a set pattern  of cooperation 
can  be  sustained  throughout  the  experiment.  In  fact,  under  altruism, 
cooperation  could  increase  toward  the end of the experiment  as people  become 
more  certain  that  altruism  will  be reciprocated. 
2.  Strangers. The  computer  randomly  paired  the  I4  subjects  for  every 
iteration  of the prisoner's  dilemma,  for a total  of  200  iterations.  That  is, each 
subject  had  a new  partner  every  iteration.  To  make  sure  that  there  were  no 
presentation  differences  between  the strangers  and  the partners,  subjects were 
also given  summaries  of their performance  every  Io  rounds,  as was done  with 
the  partners. 
For strangers,  there is no incentive  for any one subject  to build  a reputation. 
Under  a perfect rationality  assumption,  there should  be no cooperation  in this 
group,  especially  by the end of the experiment.  Note,  however,  that the number 
of subjects  is small  relative  to  the  number  of rounds  so it is not  inconceivable 
that  the  group  as  a  whole  could  build  a  reputation  (Kandori,  I992).  We 
examine  this hypothesis  below. 
3.  Computer5o. The  instructions  for  this  group  were  identical  to  the 
8  Unfortunately, only  I2  subjects could be recruited for condition 4, computero. 
(  Royal Economic Society I993 I993]  THE  FINITELY  REPEATED  PRISONER  S  DILEMMA  575 
instructions  for the  partners,  except  that  this group  was  given  a 50  0  chance 
of meeting  a computer  partner  in  any  io-period  game,  rather  than  another 
subject  in  the  room.  They  were  told  the  computer  would  play  the  tit-for-tat 
strategy  (called  'copy  cat'  in  the instructions). 
This  conditions  takes the Kreps et al.  ( I982)  hypothesis  literally.  Relative  to 
the partner's  group,  subjects  in  this condition  should  have  greater  confidence 
that  they  may  be  playing  an  altruistic  opponent,  and  under  the  sequential 
equilibrium  reputation  hypothesis  should  be  more  cooperative  than  the 
partners.  If they  are not  more  cooperative,  this would  contradict  a model  of 
sequential  equilibrium. 
4.  Computero.  This  condition  is  equivalent  to  the  computer5o  condition, 
except  that subjects were told that  the chance  of playing  the tit-for-tat  partner 
was I/IOOO,  i.e. o I %. 
If  more  cooperation  is observed  in  the  computer5o  condition  than  in  the 
partners  condition,  it  could  be  that  common  knowledge  of  the  tit-for-tat 
strategy,  rather than changes  in the probability  of playing  an altruist,  could  be 
influencing  play.  For this reason  we  also ran the  computero  condition,  which 
is equivalent  to computer5o  except  that subjects were told that the chance  was 
approximately  zero  that  they  would  actually  play  the computer.  In  this case, 
the tit-for-tat  strategy  was common  knowledge,  but  the probability  of playing 
an altruist was not  (directly)  increased.  If common  knowledge  of the tit-for-tat 
strategy  alone  is sufficient  to encourage  altruism,  then  computeros  should  be 
more  cooperative  than  partners. 
During  each  iteration  of the game  subjects in each  condition  were  told  their 
last  round  decision,  the  decision  of their  opponent,  and  their  earnings.  They 
were also told how  many  rounds remained  with  their current  partner  (zero for 
strangers),  and  how  many  rounds  remained  in  the  experiment  in  total.  All 
subjects were given  a recap of their earnings  every  i o periods,  and all terminals 
beeped  at the recap.  In addition,  every time the computer  randomly  rematched 
the subjects,  the words 'New  Partner'  flashed on the computer  screen.  Subjects 
were  also given  an option  of reviewing  all of their previous  periods  of play  at 
any  time  by  hitting  a single  key  on  the  keyboard,  and  then  paging  up  and 
down. 
Subjects in all four conditions  also participated  in an unanticipated  'restart'. 
After all 200  rounds  of the main  experiment  were complete,  subjects were  told 
that  they  would  play  an additional  io-period  game.  For these  ten periods  the 
subjects were matched  with  a computer, player rather than another  person,  and 
the  computer  played  the  tit-for-tat  strategy  for  sure.  This  was  announced 
verbally  to all subjects,  and  a description  of the tit-for-tat  strategy  was written 
on  a chalkboard  for all subjects  to see. 
The  purpose  of  the  restart  is  to  gauge  the  strategic  sophistication  of  the 
subjects,  independent  of any altruism.  The  optimal  strategy  is to cooperate  for 
9 periods,  and defect  on the tenth.  One  might  suspect  that experience  with  the 
repeated  game,  and  especially  experience  with  tit-for-tat  players,  might 
increase  a subject's  ability  to choose  the optimal  strategy  when  faced  with  the 
sure prospect  of playing  a computer  using  tit-for-tat.  Hence,  if subjects  learn 
(  Royal Economic Society I993 
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the sequential equilibrium, one might expect that partners, computer5os, and 
computeros will perform better in the restart than strangers, and that perhaps 
even that computer5os should perform better than the rest. 
III.  RESULTS 
In this section we present evidence that the behaviour of subjects is consistent 
with the predictions of the sequential equilibrium reputation model. However, 
the data also suggests that, in addition to holding beliefs that a fraction of the 
population may be altruistic, a significant share of the subjects actually appear 
to be altruistic. 
The Sequential  Equilibrium  Hypothesis 
Fig. 2 illustrates the average percent cooperation across all ten rounds of the 
repeated game, for all 20  Io-period games. Comparing the partners, strangers 
and the computer5os, we see patterns that are consistent with the predictions 
of  the  sequential  equilibrium reputation  model.  First, partners are  more 
80 
60  \_  _  Computer50s 
_  \  P~~~~~~~~~~artners  \ 
% 40  s 
>  9  ~~~ComputerOs  \\ 
0 
Strangers 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Round 
Fig. 2.  Percent cooperation by round. Averaged over all 20  i o-period games. 
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cooperative  than strangers. Using  a Mann-Whitney  nonparametric  test, we see 
that  subjects  in  the  partners  condition  cooperate  significantly  more  than 
strangers, with z =  3o079,  which  is significant  at the ac <  o ooi  level.9 Likewise, 
computer5os  are also significantly  more cooperative  than strangers  (z =  3-359, 
a  <  o oo i).  Second,  for both computer5os  and partners,  cooperation  is highest 
in  the  early  rounds  and  declines  near  the  endgame.  Splitting  each  condition 
into  two groups,  rounds  I-5  and rounds  6-io,  we can compare  the behaviour 
of  subjects  in  the  two  halves  of  each  io-round  game.  Both  partners  and 
computer5os  are significantly  more cooperative  in the first five rounds  of each 
game  (z =  3I27,  a  <  OOOI  for  partners,  and  z =  IP723,  oc<  o004  for 
computer5os).  However,  for  strangers,  there  is  no  significant  difference 
between  the first five and last five rounds of each repeated  game  (z =  I 36). All 
of these  results  are consistent  with  the  reputation  building  hypothesis.  Third, 
the  computer5os  are  significantly  more  cooperative  than  partners.  The 
significance  of  this  difference  shows  up  entirely  in  the  second  half  of the  IO- 
round game.  Looking  at only rounds  I-5,  the levels of cooperation  are roughly 
the same  for partners  and  computer5os  (z =  o85o).  However  over  the final  5 
rounds  of  each  Io-round  game  the  computer5os  are  significantly  more 
cooperative  than  partners  (z =  2- I 37,  a  <  o oi).  This  implies  that  the  main 
difference  between  partners and computer5os  is that subjects in the computer5o 
condition  simply  wait  until  later  in  the  game  to  defect.  Again,  this  is fully 
consistent  with  the predictions  of the sequential  equilibrium  hypothesis. 
Next  we  examine  the  computero  condition.  First  we  can  observe  that  the 
behaviour  of  the  computeros  is  not  significantly  different  from  partners10 
(z =  -  I28).  However,  like  the  partners,  computeros  are  significantly  more 
cooperative  than  strangers  (z =  193,  a  <  0-03),  and  significantly  less  co- 
operative  than  computer5os  (z =-22I  I,  a  <  002).  Hence,  simply  making  the 
tit-for-tat  strategy  common  knowledge  does  not  by  itself  appear  to have  any 
significant  impact  on  cooperation.11 
Finally,  it is interesting  to note  that  the  average  level  of cooperation  in the 
end-game,  round  I o,  is  virtually  identical  for  partners,  strangers,  and 
computeros,  and is only slightly  higher  for computer5os.  This  is also consistent 
with  the  sequential  equilibrium  hypothesis. 
9 The Mann-Whitney  test statistic is approximately normal. This test will also be used in all subsequent 
test statistics  reported. To calculate the statistic, begin by finding the average percentage cooperation of each 
subject in the two samples to be compared. Pool the samples and rank them. The statistic then looks for 
significant differences in the rank sums across conditions. This non-parametric test is superior to tests based 
on means for samples of this size because it is not easily influenced by the actions of a small number (i.e. one 
or two) of subjects. 
10 The  result is similar if we consider rounds  I-5  and rounds 6-io  separately, with z =  I-  598  and 
z  =-I  *03  i  respectively. 
1  One curious observation from Fig. 2  is that for both computer5os and computeros cooperation actually 
peaks in the second or third round, rather than the first. This appears to be due to a small number of' testers', 
who, in early rounds of the experiment, began every io-period game by defecting in order to 'test' if they 
were playing a tit-for-tat opponent. However, subjects quickly learned the futility of this, and over the last 
half of the experiment there was very little behaviour that could be seen as testing. These testers  may explain 
why  the  mean  level  of cooperation among  the  computeros is  actually  below  that  of  the  partners. In 
particular, testers in early games may have reduced the 'homemade priors' on altruism, diminishing the 
expected benefits to reputation building. 
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Fig. 3. % cooperation by round: Final 20  rounds of play. 
The typical patterns of play in this experiment can be seen most clearly in 
Fig. 3, where we show the final two io-period games (rounds i8i  to  200)  for 
the partners, strangers, and computer5os.12  As predicted, cooperation by the 
partners peaks in round one, at 86%,  and stays above 50?0  for 4-6  rounds 
before falling to zero. For computer5os, cooperation is level at about 60-70 % 
for the first 8 periods, until it falls to about 7-I4%.  Strangers, on the other 
hand, vary cooperation frequently over the ten-period set, with cooperation 
between 7 and 280%.  Again, these patterns are consistent with the sequential 
equilibrium reputation hypothesis. 
The  Altruism  Hypothesis 
In the last subsection we saw evidence that subjects were willing to build a 
reputation for altruism. This leaves the more subtle question of whether some 
12  For ease of presentation, we did not include the computeros in the figure. However, their relative 
position is like that in Fig. 2;  they are significantly more cooperative than strangers, but not as cooperative 
as the other two. 
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Fig. 4. Mean time until first defection. 
subjects  actually  are  altruists.  Evidence  on  this  can  be found  in  Fig.  4.  This 
shows  the  mean  round  of  first  defection  for  partners,  computer5os  and 
strangers.13 Contrary  to the  rationality  hypothesis,  partners  and  computer5os 
waited  longer  until  their first defection  as the  experiment  progressed,  even  in 
the  final  games.  This  is  consistent  with  a  hypothesis  of  altruism  in  which 
subjects  continue  to  update  their  priors  on  the  degree  of  altruism  in  the 
population  throughout  the experiment.  Looking  at the strangers,  after a brief 
initial  increase  in  the  percent  of cooperation,  the  mean  time  until  first defect 
remained  remarkably  stable  over  the  course  of the  experiment.  This  again  is 
13  Results similar to those in Fig. 4 obtain if the median is used. In calculating the means and medians, 
subjects who played all-cooperate were assumed to defect on round i i.  However, there were very few such 
subjects. The computeros are not presented, but they were again more cooperative than strangers, but less 
than partners. One can also note in Fig. 4 that there is more variance among partners and computer5os than 
among strangers. This, probably, reflects floor effects among strangers, who are mostly choosing to defect, 
rather than reflecting any significant behavioural differences. 
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consistent with the view that, after learning the distribution of altruism in the 
population, a stable set of cooperative players developed. 
Looking more closely at the strangers we can see additional evidence of 
altruism. If there is no real altruism, strangers should reach mutual defection 
at some point in the game and remain there. If there is a possibility for group 
reputations, then this too should be diminished as the end of the experiment 
approaches. As can be seen in Fig. 3, cooperation did not deteriorate at the end 
of the game. In fact, a detailed look at the data shows that the general pattern 
of cooperation among strangers illustrated in Fig.  2  is representative of the 
level of cooperation throughout the entire experiment. 
The fact that strangers  develop a stable pattern of cooperation suggests that 
perhaps they may be playing a Nash equilibrium game where subjects have 
incomplete information about the altruism of their opponents. We can examine 
this  hypothesis by  considering the  model  of  reciprocal altruism discussed 
earlier. If this were the true model, then individuals would know their own 
altruism parameter oc,  but not their opponent's. All subjects would have prior 
beliefs about the distribution of oc's  and would be playing a Nash equilibrium 
game of imperfect information. Assuming that all subjects  have common priors 
about the distribution of types, then we can solve for a critical value of oc,  oc*, 
such that all subjects with ot > oc*  will always cooperate and all subjects with 
ot  < oc*  will always defect. Those with ot  equal to oc*  will, in equilibrium, choose 
a mixed strategy.14  Given the payoff parameters specified in Fig. i,  those with 
oc  = oc* will  cooperate with  probability p* = 4/ (x* -  I),  where o*  is some 
positive  number greater than  5  (since this  is  the  difference between  the 
temptation payoff I2  and the cooperation payoff 7). 
The  above  equilibrium indicates that  we  should observe three types of 
subjects: cooperators  who only cooperate, defectors  who only defect, and mixers 
who  cooperate with  probability p*.  Notice  that  this imperfect-information 
equilibrium imposes a certain amount of symmetry on the outcome of the 
game. Suppose a mixer observes cooperation with probability po > p*. Then 
a mixer should update his beliefs about the distribution of types and become a 
cooperator. Likewise, if the observed  p is less thanp* the subject should become 
a defector. Let pm  be the probability of cooperation by a mixer, and let pn  be 
the  probability  of  cooperation  by  a  non-mixer,  that  is,  cooperators and 
defectors combined. Define 7T as the proportion of mixers in the population. 
Then  the  probability  of  cooperation  that  a  mixer  actually  observes, is 
po  =  7TPm  +  (i  -  7T) pn. Since in equilibrium  pm =  p*  and po =  p*,  it follows that 
Pn = p* in equilibrium as well. This implication of the imperfect-information 
equilibrium will serve the basis of our test of the model. 
To examine this incomplete information  equilibrium, we begin by examining 
the strangers  condition for the last half of the experiment. By this point subjects 
have experience in IOO  games, and should have a well developed sense of the 
14  Solving for the equilibrium can be sketched as follows. Letf(cx), o <  a <  oo be the distribution of types. 
Then  let  cx* be  the critical level of a  and let p*  be the  equilibrium probability of cooperation. Then 
the  equilibrium  can  be  solved  from  the  equations  p*(7+0c*)+(,-p*)o  =p*I2+(I-p*)4,  and 
P  =  f  f(cx) dcx. 
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probability of cooperation in the population. Then define defectors as those 
subjects whose behaviour is not significantly different from a strategy of total 
defection. At  the  9900  confidence interval, this requires defecting at  least 
93*7  %0  of the time. This method identifies five subjects  who can be classified as 
defectors,  with defection rates of ranging from 97 to I OO  0,  and an average rate 
of 98 8 % defection. Defining cooperators as those whose behaviour does not 
significantly differ from total cooperation, we can identify one subject who 
cooperated 9400  at the time. Another seven subjects fell in between, and can 
readily be classified as mixers. These subjects  cooperated from IO  to 32 % of the 
time,  and with  average rate of  200  cooperation. There was one  subject, 
subject 7, who displayed an unusual pattern of trying to use the  io-round 
summary as a coordination device, and hence often cooperated significantly in 
early  rounds in  each  io-round  set.  This  subject had  an  overall  level  of 
cooperation of 420%,  well above the other mixers. Hence, it is unclear whether 
subject 7 should be classified as a mixer or a cooperator. As a result we will 
present the data with both classifications of this subject, beginning with the 
classification as a cooperator. 
With this classification, we find that the average probability of cooperation 
by  mixers  is  Pm  =  0-2000,  and  the  average  cooperation  that  the  mixers 
observed'5 is po =  o I958. The combined cooperation of the cooperators and 
defectors is pn  =  o-2028,  while  the overall  probability  of cooperation  is 020I5. 
These numbers are all strikingly  similar, and are consistent with the imperfect- 
information equilibrium explanation. Reclassifying subject 7 as a mixer, we 
find Pm  =  o02275,  po =  o I988, and pn  = o I667. Again, these numbers are all 
close in value, and not significantly different. Similar results hold up for the 
total experiment in general."6  With the original classification of subjects, we 
find Pm  =  o0I842,  po =  o I  8o8  and pn  =  o02007,  with overall cooperation of 
O I9I 7. By classifying subject 7 as a mixer, we find Pm  =  o-2o8i,  P0 =  o?I870, 
and pn  =  O I 7  I 7. Again, as predicted by the imperfect-information  equilibrium, 
Pm  and pn  are very similar. 
This suggests that the behaviour in the stranger condition is consistent with 
an imperfect-information equilibrium in which individuals share a common 
prior on the probability of experiencing cooperation, p*, of about 0O20. Two 
previous studies have also estimated subjects'  subjective priors on cooperation. 
Camerer and Weigelt  (i 988)  estimated 'homemade  priors' of o-  I7  that an 
opponent  would  play  cooperatively,  and  McKelvey  and  Palfrey  (I 992) 
estimated the proportion of altruists to,  be o 5 and o io.  The similarity of these 
estimates to our own is a pleasant surprise. 
The  Restart 
After completing the main experiment, all subjects were told that they would 
play against the tit-for-tat strategy for a Io-period repeated game. The striking 
15  The value p0  is determined by finding the actual level of cooperation observed by each mixer. 
16  For the entire experiment, mixers range from 7-5 to 24-5  % cooperation, defectors range from 95-5 to 
I00%  defection, and two cooperators have 97 and 62-5  % cooperation. 
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result from the restart is that all conditions perform almost identically. This is 
true in the individual data as well as the aggregate data. In the partners  group, 
8 of I4  subjects chose to the optimal strategy of cooperation until the final 
round. In both the strangers and the computer5os, the number was 7 of I4 
subjects, while the computeros had 8 subjects choose the optimal strategy.17 
The restart shows that the level of sophistication of subjects in all conditions 
was about the same. For instance, strangers, who had no experience with the 
finitely  repeated play,  were just  as  successful at  exploiting  the  computer 
strategy as were  the  computer5os, who  had  experience playing  tit-for-tat 
opponents. Hence, while subjects generally exhibit behaviour consistent with 
the sequential equilibrium prediction in the main experiment, the restart  shows 
that they do not uniformly demonstate the strategic sophistication that we 
ascribe to sequential equilibrium players in theory. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  presented  experiments  designed  to  examine  the  sequential 
equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner's  dilemma. 
Our results  support the sequential equilibrium prediction. Subjects in a finitely 
repeated prisoner's  dilemma were significantly more cooperative than subjects 
in a repeated single-shot game. Moreover, by increasing subjects'  beliefs about 
the  probability  that  their  opponent  is  altruistic, we  can  further increase 
reputation building. 
Several findings in the experiment suggest that, rather than simply believing 
that some subjects  may be altruistic, many subjects actually are altruistic. Play 
in the repeated single-shot game is consistent with a model of warm-glow in 
which people get additional utility from mutual cooperation, and our results 
suggest that there is a stable fraction of such altruists in the population. The 
evolution of play in the repeated games is also consistent with the altruism 
hypothesis. Rather  than  defecting earlier in  each  of the  series of repeated 
games,  subjects continue  to  increase  their  waiting  time  until  their  first 
defection, even as the experiment nears the end. 
In summary, subjects appear very willing to build reputations for altruisms. 
However,  it  seems important to  the observed play  of the game  that some 
subjects actually are altruists. In contrast to the strict, purely rational, version 
of the reputation building hypothesis, there may be no real difference in the 
beliefs that an opponent is an altruist and the actual chance it is so. 
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17  There were also other similarities  across conditions. Every condition had one or two 'alternators' who 
began with defection and alternated getting the temptation and the sucker  payoff, until round I O when they 
took  the  mutual  defection payoff.  Each  condition  had  one  subject playing  all-cooperate, except  the 
computeros who had the only subject who played all-defect. All conditions, except the strangers, had one 
subject who cooperated until round 8, and defected for rounds 9 and  IO. 
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APPENDIX 
Subjects'  Instructions  for  the Computer5o  Condition 
THE UNIVERSITY  OF WISCONSIN 
Department of Economics 
Subjects' Instructions 
WELCOME 
This experiment is a study of economic decision making. The instructions  are simple. 
If you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable 
amount of money. 
The money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. A 
research foundation has provided the funds for this study. 
The One-Round Decision 
In this experiment you will be paired with one other player. You will be paired with 
this player through a computer network -  at no time will your true identity be revealed 
to  the  other participants. The  other player,  like yourself, was  recruited from an 
economics course at the UW. 
Both you and the other player will have two possible choices. You can choose LEFT 
or you can choose RIGHT. If you both choose LEFT you will both get a payoff of 7 
cents. If you both choose RIGHT you will both get a payoff of 4 cents. If you choose 
RIGHT but the other player chooses LEFT, you will get a payoff of I 2 cents, but the 
other player will receive o cents. Likewise, if you choose LEFT but the other player 
chooses RIGHT, then you receive o cents and the other player receives I  2 cents. These 
payoffs are summarized  in the table below. The bold number in the top portion of each 
box is the payment received by you, the number in the bottom is the payment received 
by the other player: 
Payoff  From  Your  Move 
LEFIT  RIGHT 
7  12 
LEFT 
Other  7  0 
Player's 
Payoff  0  4 
RIGHT 
12  4 
When choosing your move, you will not  know the choice of the other player. You 
must make your choice without  knowing what the other player will choose. After all 
players  in the experiment  have  made  their choices,  the computer  will report to you  the 
move  chosen  by  the  other  player  and  your  payoff  from  this round  of play. 
Sets  of Rounds 
You  will  play  the one-round  game just  described  in  io  one-round  sets. That  is, each 
set of play  will  consist  of  Io one-round  games.  To  begin  a set of rounds,  the computer 
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will randomly match you with another player in the room. You  will then  play the  one-round 
game  just described  with  the  same  playerfor  a total  of IO rounds.  That is, all i o rounds in the 
set will be played with the same other player. 
After the i oth round a new set will begin. The computer will randomly reassign  you 
to play with another player: every  io rounds  you  will be  randomly  reassigned  to a new  subject. 
You will never  be assigned to play with the same person for more than io  rounds. 
Reminder:  During  each  io-round  set, you will be  playing  each  one-round  game  with  the  same 
other  player  for all IO rounds. 
At the end of each round, the computer will tell you your move in the last round, 
the other player's move, and your earnings from that round. At the end of each set, the 
computer will tell you your total earnings for the entire io-round set. 
We will play this game for a total of 20  sets of io  rounds each. That is, there will be 
20  sets,  and  each  will  have  io  decision  rounds.  Thus,  during  the  course  of  the 
experiment  you  will  play  a total  of  200  one-round  games. 
Computer  Players 
At the beginning  of every set there is a chance  that you will be randomly  paired  with 
a computer  player,  rather  than  a fellow  participant  in the  experiment.  For  every  i0- 
round  set,  the  chance  that  you  will  be paired  with  a computer  player  is  I/2.  That  is, 
there  is a 50  0  chance  that  you  will  be  assigned  the  computer  player.  If you  are not 
paired  with  the computer,  you will be matched  with  another  person in the experiment. 
Computer  Moves 
The  computer  player is always  programmed  to use a very simple  'copy  cat'  rule. The 
computer  will start every  i o-round  set by choosing  LEFT.  After that the computer  will 
make the same choice  that you made  on the previous  round.  For example,  if you choose 
LEFT  on round  i,  the computer  will  choose  LEFT  on round  2.  If you  choose  RIGHT 
on  round  2,  the  computer  will  choose  RIGHT  on  round  3. And  so on. 
Confidentiality 
Your  identity  in the experiment  will not be made  known  to any other participant  at 
any  time  in  the  experiment.  Your decisions  and payoffs are confidential. 
Do  not  discuss  your  choices  or  payoffs  with  any  other  player! 
Thank  you  and  Good  Luck! 
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